Undoubtedly, America must reduce its government expenditures—both domestically and internationally—in order to constrain the unsustainable growth rate of the national debt. The hope for an engineered economic surplus to conjure revenues is misguided. While domestic programs, specifically entitlements, will be pared back either in law or monetary policy, international expenditures will require equal adjustments. The single most significant line item in this category is the military.
Despite their substantial domestic connections and expenditure, the Services' primary mission is inter-nation warfare. Defense of the nation state is as reasonable as any domestic expenditure for both depend upon a nation. However, the need for a large reduction in defense expenditures is in no way rebutted by the absurd claims of establishment leaders that even a modest reduction would threaten national security. An ironic flaw in this logic is that current expenditure levels are jeopardizing stability domestically and risking long-term national security.
The current situation dictates both a clarification regarding the role of the military and a separation of funding and laws for different parts of the organization. The Services are good stewards of taxpayer money when called upon to do so, but when awash in funds as they have been for the past decade, all branches have a tendency to overly favor entrenched interests instead of most effectively and efficiently winning the current battle. The problem arises in the difficult task of assessing the risk of the next inter-nation war. Although the prospect seems removed from our current circumstances, any error in assumptions could prove fatal. History has a tendency to repeat itself and denying the possibility of another large national war speaks only to a lack of historical understanding.
But what is "inter-nation war?" This question is key to understanding divisions within the defense establishment and problems with its current organization. Here applied, the term refers to any conflict, between countries, that has large formation ground battles and contested air-superiority. Most of the last centuries major wars are included in this definition: World War I and II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. The beginnings of Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF) could fall in this category, but the latter portions do not. Although battles are taking place in these conflicts, the enemy forces can't amass for significant durations to engage American forces, since any attempt to do so would result in annihilation from the air.
OIF and OEF have been called small wars, but a better term is contingency operations. There is considerable overlap between the units engaging in inter-nation war and those engaging in contingency operations, yet the distinction is important to better understand the military and structure its financing to best achieve the goal of national security.
Contingency operations can range from the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, to anti-terrorism missions in Somalia and the South Pacific. The use of lethal force by Americans distinguishes these operations from humanitarian missions, which should receive funding through the State Department, U.S. AID, or other agencies. Although the units involved substantially differ between operations, the missions are similar, to use force in a limited manner to obtain national goals. This differs from inter-nation warfare, where the degree of force is much more substantial and where losing significantly jeopardizes the country's security.
When discussing funding for national security, the main question should not be how much money to give the military, but how much money to give the military for inter-nation war and how much for contingency operations. The military's current structure doesn't allow for an efficient allocation of resources between these goals. Extravagant amounts of capital are consumed by units designed for inter-nation war but are engaging in contingency operations. This misallocation exemplifies the military's tendency to put square pegs in round holes.
A better strategy would direct funding for contingency operations through a specific branch of the military. Then funding for inter-nation war can be given to other branches. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is in a perfect position to act as the recipient for this contingency operation funding. While the budget for JSOC is already substantial, the organization still relies on other parts of the military for enormous support. The division of funding, however, allows the country to best determine how much money should go toward each mission. Then JSOC can choose how to spend its money on contingency operations, while the rest of the military continues to focus on inter-nation war.
But how significant is the impact of the current organization of funding? Tremendous. Probably the most illustrative example is in the use of airpower. In both OIF and OEF, JSOC has made tremendous impact by taking apart insurgency networks, but in order to accomplish this task, operators must go on dangerous missions to kill or capture key high value individuals in the network. These operators need various layers of air-support for these missions.
But what type of aircraft should fill these roles? Some of the favorites for ground forces are AC-130s, Apaches, and A-10s. Unfortunately, the Navy would rather provide F-18s, while the Air Force wants to send F-15s and 16s, along with B-1s and 2s, all platforms designed for inter-nation warfare, not contingency operations. While these aircraft may sometimes be called for, they often perform missions less effectively and at significantly more cost then other aircraft.
Consider a pair of F-18s launching from a carrier in the Arabian Sea and flying a six-hour mission into Afghanistan. Only an hour and a half of mission time is spent supporting troops on the ground, the rest is spent in transit and refueling. At around $10,000 dollars + a flight hour the cost of these missions quickly result in billions. Yet the total costs are even more substantial. The aircraft carriers and support structure cost more billions, not to mention the loss of service life for ship and aircraft and the cost of replacing them.
By allowing JSOC to control the entire funding for a contingency operation, a specific branch is responsible for the allocation of resources to contingency operations. Instead of fighters and bombers, they can choose light attack aircraft that better accomplish the mission at a fraction of the cost. JSOC is thus accountable for the efficient allocation of funding for their mission set. If they need more firepower or support for a particular mission, they can direct the funds to the regular military who can then provide the assets, without diverting funding for inter-nation war.
Another justification for the separation of responsibility pertains to the law. At the current time there is a huge divide both in law and opinion between what is allowable during wartime and what is not. The prerogatives granted to the executive branch during wartime are enormous and rightfully so, best expressed by the Founding Fathers in making the President the Commander-in-chief. Yet the powers granted in wartime most surely are in regards to inter-nation wars. The country should have the opportunity to hold leadership accountable by law with a finer gradation then at war or not at war.
As an example: "How long should operations in foreign countries be kept secret from the public?" It is without question that the citizenry has the right to know if other Americans are using lethal force in foreign countries, but how long after the fact should the information be released. Clearly there is a period where secrecy can be a significant advantage, but the challenge is determining when it is becoming a shield for accountability. When the U.S. Government, the foreign government, and the foreign population know about the operations, it is probably time for the American people to know too. The excuse that we can't officially acknowledge the fact because of the foreign government is a hollow lie. Informing the American people is more important than relations with a country that lies to its people.
While a legal redefinition of wars and shifting funds within the DOD may be challenging, it is a positive way forward for the security of the United States. Costs must be kept under control, an international presence must be maintained, and the American people should be in control over their military and its operations abroad. Never ending wars on terror may exist, but the distinction from World Wars is becoming ever more important as the divide between the military and the citizenry grows.